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Abstract
Mindfulness is rapidly becoming a mainstream educational intervention. A growing number of 
schools, colleges, and universities are incorporating mindfulness into the curriculum, and while there 
is a substantial body of research literature in psychology attesting to the mental and physical benefits 
of mindfulness, critics of the movement have suggested that mindfulness lacks social and political 
dimensions. In this article, a response to “Mindfulness, Democracy, and Education,” the author shows 
why this line of criticism is misguided. Far from being self- centered, asocial, and apolitical, the prac-
tice of mindfulness is intrinsically political.
This article is a response to:
Hyde, A., & LaPrad, J. (2015). Mindfulness, democracy, and education. Democracy & Education, 23(2), 
Article 2. Available online at http://democracyeducationjournal.org/home/vol23/iss2/2
Mindfulness is on its way to becoming a mainstream educational intervention. A growing number of American K– 12 schools 
are integrating mindfulness into the curriculum— the epicenter 
seems to be somewhere around California and Oregon— and the 
trend shows few signs of slowing. The emergence of mindfulness in 
schools is in part a function of popular interest in all things mindful 
(the cover of a recent Time magazine proclaimed “The Mindful 
Revolution”) but also the result of the work of nonprofit organiza-
tions like Mindful Schools, which runs professional development 
programs for teachers. Add to this mix the fact that a growing 
number of teachers are themselves mindfulness practitioners, and 
the stage has been set for the mindful classroom. It may be too early 
yet to gauge empirically the effectiveness of mindfulness as an 
educational intervention; only a handful of small- scale studies have 
been done so far, and most have methodological problems, like 
small sample sizes and lack of a control group. Even so, the early 
results are suggestive. Mindfulness has been shown to bring about 
positive changes to students’ stress levels, attention, empathy, and 
self- control, findings that are consistent with anecdotal reports 
from teachers, students, and parents (Black & Fernando, 2013). 
Interestingly, the benefits of mindfulness appear to extend to 
teachers as well. A recent study indicated that mindfulness practice 
reduces teacher burnout, improves the self- regulation of stress, and 
increases teaching efficacy— no small benefits for overstressed 
teachers in the era of accountability (Flook, Goldberg, Pinger, 
Bonus, & Davidson, 2013).
For all its success, the mindfulness movement has had its 
critics, and one of the most common criticisms is based on an 
intuitive way of understanding mindfulness. The criticism is this: 
Mindfulness, because it is a self- directed and self- regarding 
practice, is self- centered— selfish, even— and, as such, it is a recipe 
for political quietism and disengagement. Mindfulness, in this 
view, lacks social and political dimensions. It brings about compla-
cency and acquiescence on the political stage, and its harshest 
critics consider it to be a form of navel- gazing. Focusing on the self, 
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the thinking goes, draws people inward, and moves them further 
away from social and political action.
Hyde and LaPrad (2015) responded to this line of objection 
convincingly. They showed that, far from inhibiting the democratic 
ethos, mindfulness actually enhances it. Using theoretical frame-
works offered by Dewey and Freire, they pointed out many 
affinities between mindfulness and democratic values, and their 
look at three schools in the Coalition of Essential Schools is 
evidence of the practice’s pedagogical and democratic value. My 
aim in what follows is to make a complementary argument. I hope 
to further illustrate the conceptual ties between mindfulness and 
democracy, but my focus will be on one particular claim Hyde and 
LaPrad made, which is that mindfulness improves the ability to pay 
attention to our sensations, emotions, and thoughts. They wrote: 
“Mindfulness allows us to train ourselves in bringing attention to 
our sensations, emotions, and thoughts, keeping all in balance yet 
without denial or restriction” (p. 4). My intention is to offer an 
account of how exactly mindfulness trains attention on thoughts 
and emotions in a balanced way and to show why heightened 
attention to thoughts and emotions is relevant to democratic 
governance. While Hyde and LaPrad drew on Dewey and Freire,  
I use the framework offered by James (1890/1950), who took a keen 
interest in teaching and learning, and whose ideas on attention and 
emotions form the foundation of modern psychological research. 
The first half of the essay is devoted to attention; the second half 
takes up the topic of emotions. Overall, I hope to show— along 
with Hyde and LaPrad— that mindfulness, far from being solipsis-
tic and socially disengaged, is intrinsically political.
A note on mindfulness is necessary at the outset, however. The 
word is ambiguous. It is used in several different senses, and so it is 
important to make a few distinctions among the different versions 
of the concept before setting out. The most common meaning of 
mindfulness is found in the work of Kabat- Zinn (2005), who 
characterized mindfulness as a special type of awareness: open, 
accepting, nonjudgmental awareness, centered in the present 
moment (pp. 108– 109). Kabat- Zinn also used the word to refer to a 
particular style of meditation, mindfulness meditation, usually 
done while sitting or walking, and mindfulness as a practice is 
understood to be a method for developing mindfulness as aware-
ness (pp. 108– 109).1 These two senses of mindfulness are slightly 
different still from the sense of mindfulness found in the Pali 
Canon, the earliest extant record of the Buddha’s teachings, where 
mindfulness (sati in Pali) is understood not as a quality of aware-
ness but as a function of memory.2 The distinction shows up in 
1 Kabat- Zinn sometimes described these two forms as “deliberate 
mindfulness” and “spontaneous mindfulness.”
2 See, for example, the Samyutta Nikaya, translated by Bhikkhu (2012, p. 9): 
“And which is the faculty of sati? There is the case where a disciple of the 
noble ones has sati, is endowed with excellent proficiency in sati, remem-
bering & recollecting what was done and said a long time ago. He remains 
focused on the body in & of itself— ardent, alert, & having sati— subduing 
greed and distress with reference to the world. He remains focused on 
feelings in & of themselves . . . the mind in & of itself . . . mental qualities in 
& of themselves— ardent, alert, & having sati— subduing greed & distress 
with reference to the world. This is called the faculty of sati.”
grammatical terms: the adjective mindful is used both transitively 
and intransitively. Sometimes the word takes an object, as when 
so- and- so is being mindful of the time or the number of napkins 
used; at other times, one is mindful simpliciter, without there being 
the need for a particular thought or object to be kept in mind.
The practice I focus on here, mindfulness of breathing, 
involves mindfulness in both senses, and in many contemporary 
mindfulness instructions, the distinction is mostly a matter of 
emphasis. The basic task of the mindfulness of breathing is to focus 
on the sensation of the breathing process. The skill being practiced 
is the skill of paying attention to how the breathing process feels. 
Because the breathing process occurs in the present moment, 
focusing on individual breaths as they come and go necessarily 
means maintaining a present- centered, high- quality awareness, of 
the sort Kabat- Zinn (2005) described. Because focusing on the 
breathing process for any length of time requires continually 
remembering to pay attention to it, mindfulness as memory— the 
sense found in the Pali Canon— is involved as well.
One of the remarkable features of breathing is that it is one of 
the few bodily processes that is both automatic and also under our 
conscious control. We do not have to remember to breathe, 
fortunately, thanks to specialized areas in the brain stem, but when 
we want to, we can deliberately adjust our breathing, and the 
adjustment brings about a change in mental state, however subtle. 
Breathing occupies a nexus between mind and body— a fact 
evident in the advice given to anyone who is about to give a big 
speech or undertake some other activity likely to rattle the nerves: 
Take a few deep breaths. What the strategy consists of is using the 
mind to calm the body— to calm the mind. At a basic level, the 
practice of mindfulness of breathing can be understood as doing 
this strategy for an extended period of time.
Taking Possession by the Mind
In order to see how mindfulness trains attention on sensations, 
emotions, and thoughts, and in order to see how heightened 
attention is relevant to democratic governance, I start with the idea 
of attention itself. The most influential early theorist of attention 
was James (1890/1950), who devoted an entire chapter of his classic 
work The Principles of Psychology to the subject. “Everyone knows 
what attention is,” he wrote. “It is the taking possession by the 
mind, in clear and vivid form, of one out of what seem several 
simultaneously possible objects or trains of thought. Focalization, 
concentration, and consciousness are of its essence” (pp. 403– 404). 
Here James pointed out that attention entails selectivity; it means 
intentionally focusing on or directing awareness to a single object 
or train of thought from among many possible others. And while 
James distinguished among many different forms of attention in 
his chapter, perhaps the most important distinction he made was 
between passive and voluntary attention. Passive attention is 
immediate and unwilled, as when we automatically turn and look 
at the source of a sudden loud sound. But we have the capacity to 
voluntarily direct attention, and this capacity, for James, is of 
utmost importance— “the very root of judgment, character, and 
will,” he wrote (p. 424). In fact, James suggested that an education 
centered on voluntarily directing attention would be the education 
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par excellence, and, as Hyde and LaPrad pointed out, mindfulness, 
since it requires voluntarily directing attention on a fundamental 
level, seems to fit the bill.
In contemporary psychology, there is no agreement on how to 
define attention and no agreement on how exactly it works, but one 
of the most influential models of attention is the functional 
component model, where attention is thought to consist of three 
distinct mental functions: alerting, or responding to a new stimulus 
in the environment; orienting, which means selecting one object of 
attention from among others; and executive attention (also called 
executive functioning), which refers to the higher- order 
management- type functions of attention, like planning, monitor-
ing conflicts, and solving problems (Posner & Peterson, 1990,  
pp. 25– 42). Executive attention is a metaphor— there is no “execu-
tive center” in the brain— but it is a metaphor worth considering in 
more detail.3 The role of an executive is to carry out— to execute— 
decisions, and what makes the job difficult is that there are many 
competing interests to be heard. The very idea of executive atten-
tion, then, assumes that the mind is not a unitary agent; it has many 
impulses, beliefs, desires, and habits, all jostling for control. To take 
the idea of executive attention seriously is to conceive of the mind 
as more like a committee or an unruly city council than a single 
agent. This sort of idea is an old one and can be traced back at least 
as far as Plato, who, through Socrates, offered the image of the 
tripartite soul, where spirit and the appetites wrestle for power with 
reason, the original executive functioning. If the mind has its own 
politics, then mindfulness can be understood as intentionally 
transferring power to the mind’s chief executive.
The fact that attention is so closely tied to judgment, character, 
and will, as James (1890/1950) said, means there is a close connection 
between attention and identity. How we pay attention, and what we 
pay attention to, shapes the people we are— and this is especially true 
when it comes to paying attention to our own thinking habits. This 
principle is illustrated vividly in Murdoch’s (1970) essay “The Idea of 
Perfection.” Murdoch asked us to imagine a mother- in- law (M) who 
dislikes her daughter- in- law (D). M thinks that D is juvenile, 
unsophisticated, and unpolished. She feels that her son has married 
beneath him. Now, it could be that, over time, M’s view of D solidifies, 
such that she settles down with a hardened sense of grievance. But 
what Murdoch pointed out is the possibility that her attitude can 
evolve. She may soften her view to become more accepting of her 
daughter- in- law, so that what was once tiresomely juvenile comes to 
be seen as youthful and refreshingly simple. This transformation in 
M can occur even without contact between the women, and, as 
Murdoch pointed out, it is the result of a shift in attention. It comes 
about through a reflective process by which M examines— really 
looks into— her own attitudes and assumptions about D. Murdoch 
described the contents of M’s mental life perceptively: “M tells 
herself: I am old- fashioned and conventional. I may be prejudiced 
3 Research in neuroscience has shown that the prefrontal cortex— the brain 
region in humans to have evolved most recently— is most heavily involved 
in “executive” tasks like planning, monitoring conflicts, and solving 
problems. But the brain is a massively decentralized organ, and to say that 
one area is most involved is not to say that other areas are not also involved.
and narrow- minded. I may be snobbish. I am certainly jealous. Let 
me look again” (p. 17).
Murdoch’s (1970) story perfectly illustrates the mechanics of 
the “mental scripts” that Hyde and LaPrad (2015) referred to— 
mental shortcuts that, in the most pernicious cases, “see different 
others as the competition or the enemy” (p. 3). Using James’s 
(1890/1950) framework, M is voluntarily directing her attention to 
her own thought processes and, in particular, to her own prejudices 
and biases with respect to D. The claim that I make is that mindful-
ness practice opens up space for precisely this sort of critical 
self- reflection. It affords the opportunity to submit one’s own 
thoughts and beliefs to more careful scrutiny. When it comes to 
mindfulness of breathing, for example, in the course of focusing on 
what it feels like to breathe, over time one gains a sharpened sense 
of the mental events that interrupt one’s focus. Through mindful-
ness practice, the habits of the discursive mind become easier to 
see, and the process of attention substitution becomes more 
apparent, the process by which one object of attention is replaced 
by another— a process so subtle that it usually flies under the radar 
of conscious awareness.4
What is remarkable about the story of M and D is that it is a 
story in which an apparently self- centered activity— critical 
self- reflection— has a direct and immediate social impact, assum-
ing that M’s change in view will bring about a change in behavior 
toward D. A practice that seems at first glance to be exclusively 
self- regarding has hidden social dimensions. The same sort of 
reasoning, I want to suggest, holds true at the political level. At the 
heart of democracy is a commitment to the equal worth of persons 
and to the idea that every voice carries the same weight. What this 
means is that getting anything accomplished politically entails 
working together, striving to understand the views of others, 
keeping the common good in mind, and maintaining the willing-
ness to confront and revise one’s own views. None of this is easy to 
do, and it means that democracy is an extremely demanding ideal. 
But because mindfulness practice develops these qualities of 
mind— including openness to new ideas and the mental flexibility 
required to see things from another’s point of view— it can be seen 
as an asset to democratic governance.
Embodied Emotions
The idea that I turn to next is the idea that mindfulness trains the 
ability to pay attention to emotions. In order to see the relationship 
between mindfulness and emotions, and in order to see the way in 
which attention to emotions is relevant to democratic governance, it 
will be helpful to start with the nature of emotions. The commonsen-
sical way of understanding emotions is that emotions are primarily 
states of mind. To have an emotion is to feel a certain way. In his 
chapter devoted to emotions, James (1890/1950) characterized the 
commonsensical view like this: “Common- sense says, we lose our 
fortune, are sorry and weep; we meet a bear, are frightened and run; 
we are insulted by a rival, are angry and strike” (pp. 449– 450). But 
James asked us to abandon the commonsense view. The problem is 
that it has the order of operations backward. It is the body that reacts 
4 For more on the idea of attention substitution, see Bruya (2010).
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first, he said, and the mental events associated with an emotion 
follow from and are conditioned by the body. The real order of 
operations is this: “We feel sorry because we cry, angry because we 
strike, afraid because we tremble” (p. 450). An emotion separated 
from the body, then, is no emotion at all.
If we fancy some strong emotion, and then try to abstract from our 
consciousness of it all the feelings of its bodily symptoms, we find we 
have nothing left behind, no ‘mind stuff ’ out of which the emotion can 
be constituted, and that a cold and neutral state of intellectual 
perception is all that remains. (p. 451)
Understanding emotions as embodied positions us to see how 
mindfulness practice affects emotions. In the case of mindfulness 
of breathing, where a basic instruction is to breathe in an easeful, 
calming way— a way that alleviates areas of tension and tightness 
in the body— it is obvious that the practice has a direct impact on 
the body, which is the basis of emotions, according to James 
(1890/1950). Writing more than a century after James, Shusterman 
(2007) offered a helpful term to describe the sort of awareness 
developed through body- based mindfulness practices: somatic 
self- awareness, or awareness centered in the body. And in the 
natural sciences, the term proprioception is used to refer to the 
sense of how the body feels from the inside. In each case, the basic 
idea is that by gaining a sharpened sense of how the body feels 
from the inside, it is possible to acquire the ability to willfully 
manipulate and regulate the experience of emotions.
One of the peculiar things about emotions is that they are, at 
least to a certain extent, contagious. A person might feel joyful 
because people around her are expressing joy, or panicky because 
others are panicking. In psychology, this phenomenon is called 
emotional contagion theory; the intuitive idea is that emotions 
tend to spread around. Many explanations have been offered to 
account for the contagiousness of emotions, including one 
centered on mirror neurons, the significant overlap between the 
brain areas that are activated when we observe another person’s 
action and those that are activated when we perform the same 
action ourselves. However the contagiousness of emotions might 
be explained, a major implication is that, so long as are living with 
other people, emotions have an intrinsically social dimension.
But there are further reasons for thinking that the emotional 
awareness and regulation developed through mindfulness practice is 
beneficial to the democratic process. It is reasonable to think that 
elected representatives who are able to regulate their emotions are 
more likely to work effectively with others and more likely to be able 
to see issues from different points of view— major assets to the 
democratic process. And at the grassroots level, people who can 
regulate their own emotions and reflect on their own biases are ideal 
members of a participatory democracy. This principle comes out 
clearly in the case of nonviolent political activism. A successful 
nonviolent demonstration entails staying cool, calm, and collected 
under pressure, and if staying cool, calm, and collected under 
pressure is a skill developed through mindfulness practice, then 
there is a direct link between mindfulness practice and successful 
political activism. Indeed, there are many historical precedents for a 
link of this sort, including Mahatma Gandhi (1961), whose philoso-
phy of satyagraha was based on the idea that activists must first work 
on themselves in order to be successful on the political stage. For 
Gandhi, political activism and spiritual practice were two sides of the 
same coin. In this light, many of the worries about mindfulness 
leading to political quietism and disengagement can be put to rest by 
simply by looking around and seeing that practitioners of yoga, 
mindfulness, and meditation are among the most politically active 
citizens. As Hyde and LaPrad (2015) noted, “Engaging in local social 
action is quite compatible with a personal mindfulness practice and 
is the norm among yoga and mindfulness organizations” (p. 6). In a 
political climate marked by demonstrations over the killings of 
unarmed black and brown Americans by police officers, the 
emotional awareness and regulation developed through mindful-
ness practice is no trivial benefit.
Conclusion
In this essay I focused on one claim made by Hyde and LaPrad 
(2015), which is that mindfulness practice trains attention on 
thoughts and emotions. Using a framework offered by James 
(1890/1950), I tried to illustrate the mechanisms by which mindful-
ness does this, and I tried to show how the ability to pay attention 
to one’s own thoughts and emotions enhances the democratic 
ethos. The picture of mindfulness that has emerged is that of a 
radically empowering practice, for it is a practice that equips 
people with the skills to regulate their own attention and emotions. 
This means we should not be surprised if mindfulness does not get 
much support from those in power, for those in power have an 
interest in preventing those who are not from becoming too 
independent, too creative, and too insightful. But such shifts in 
power may be a vital part of the effort to restore an ailing democ-
racy back to health.
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